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Abstract
Turkey, with a population of nearly 74 million and a strategic location opening up
to Europe, Middle East, North Africa, and East Asian markets, has been one of
the fastest growing markets in the world in the present day. Having recorded a
GDP growth with a level of 11% in the first half of 2011, Turkey was regarded to
have the fastest growing industry in Europe. Turkey’s accession talks have been
around since 1950s and have been official when Turkey became an associate
member of the EU in 1963. Although Turkey has made a remarkable progress in
the last decade, EU still hesitates to accept Turkey’s full time membership. In this
essay, I have attempted to analyze the possible financial consequences of
Turkey’s accession into the EU.
In order to complete a successful study, I have divided the project into four
sections. In the first section, Summary, I have collected facts from the authorized
European Union websites and empirical studies towards which my assessment
will be given in the coming parts of the project. In the Evaluation section I started
reviewing the facts and the approaches of the member states towards the Turkish
accession based on these facts, such as positions and perspectives of the relevant
countries within the EU market and their previous experiences with EU
enlargements mainly emphasized on the 2007 EU expansion. The next section
Analysis concentrates on the future based developments and information
presented in the Evaluation and Summary sections. Therefore, in this section, I
have attempted to illustrate the foreseen benefits and fears of both sides on
Turkey’s accession. Finally, in the Conclusion section I present an answer to the
question “whether Turkey should join the EU or the economic benefits and costs
should be neglected” from Turkey’s perspective.
Since Turkey has been regarded as one of the fastest growing economies in G20
by OECD and IMF, Turkish accession into the EU and its financial implications
may alter the political, economic and strategic balances of the world in many
ways; therefore it can be claimed that including Turkey as a member state will not
only be a hard decision made by the EU on political terms but also it will be a
decision that will have crucial implications for the world economy.
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Chapter 1: Summary - Set Up

A Brief History of the EU Enlargements from an Economical Perspective
The European Union, which is an economic and political union consisting of 27
independent member states, has been in an expansion process in terms of its
borders and power since the first day. Being comprised of only six founding
states in the 1950s, now having twenty-seven member countries, the union went
through many processes, treaties and implementations. Yet, I will only focus on
the ones that are related to the expansion. Starting with the establishment of the
European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) and (EEC) in 1958, the union has
grown in size in the following years, with the accession of new countries. After
signing Euratom Treaty in 1957, the Single European Act in 1987, the Maastricht
Treaty instituted the European Union under its current tag in 1993. Finally, the
Treaty of Lisbon was the last adjustment which maintained the constitutional
basis of the Union.
European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) came into force in 1951, which
formed the basis of the European Union right after the Second World War with an
aim of strengthening the steel and the coal sectors and controlling these sectors
with an authority therein. Belgium, Germany, France, Holland, Luxemburg, and
Italy, also called as the “inner six”, were the six countries that brought the
European Coal and Steel Community into existence on April 18, 1951. The main
purpose of the treaty was to contribute support to the common market for coal and
steel, to create an economic expansion, to increase employment, and to raise the
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standard of living. This unification process therefore, had to guarantee a
systematic supply to the common market by making sure that there was an equal
access to the sources of production, via setting up the lowest possible prices and
improving the working conditions in the coal and steel industry.
Only six years after ECSC, the EEC treaty was signed in Rome in 1957. What
made the establishment of EEC unique was that it laid the foundations of the
supranational Europe. Although the first attempt for a unified European group
was not successful, as the European Defense Community came to a halt in 1954,
meetings and conferences did not end. The establishment of EEC supported the
construction of a common market, common policies, and customs union. As
stated in the articles of this treaty, the main goal was to institute a common market
and determine the obstacles the union could face during this process.
The expansion provided a vital opportunity to the countries that were preparing
themselves for the 21st century. By offering prosperity and stability to the new
members’ economies, the union seemed as a promise for a well-integrated
continent living in peace. Therefore, it can be claimed that the European Union
has achieved a successful expansion history. The Paris Treaty (1951) establishing
the European Coal and Steel Community and The Rome Treaty (1957)
establishing the European Economic Community (ECC) were signed among the
Inner Six European countries; Belgium, Germany, France, Holland, Luxemburg,
and Italy. Subsequently, the European Union went through a series of expansion
processes in terms of both physical and economical means:
o (1951) ECSC Treaty
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o (1957) EEC Treaty
•

(1957) Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxemburg and Holland (Inner
Six)
o (1957) Euratom Treaty

•

(1973) Denmark, Ireland and England

•

(1981) Greece
o (1987) The Single European Act

•

(1986) Portugal, Spain
o (1992) Maastricht Criteria

•

(1995) Austria, Finland and Sweden

•

(2004) Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia, Czech Republic, Poland, Cyprus ,
Slovakia, Slovenia and Hungary

•

(2007) Bulgaria and Romania

The Maastricht Criteria
The Treaty of Maastricht (formally, the Treaty on European Union, (TEU))
was signed on 7 February 1992 by the members of the European
Community in Maastricht, Holland. The European Commission stated the
mandatory Economic and Financial conditions to form a common monetary unit.
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These necessary Economic and Financial conditions can be classified under the
titles of -the introduction of an independent law that allows the gradual
independence of central banks and – the macroeconomic criteria:

•

The inflation rates of the lowest performing countries should be no more
than 1.5 percentage points higher than the average of the three member
states having the lowest inflations.

•

The ratio of the planned or the actual gross debt of the member countries
to their gross domestic products should not exceed 3 percent.

•

The ratio of the planned or actual debt stocks to gross domestic products
should not exceed 60 percent.

•

Every member state was allowed only to exceed the average of the best
three member states’ long-term interest rates only by 2 points in terms of
price consistency.

•

The national currency of the member states, were to remain at “normal”
fluctuation margin allowed by the European exchange rate mechanism (As
for now, it is 15%, however most of the countries remain in 2.25 margin).
By signing the Treaty of Maastricht, the political desires of the
Community came into prominence, and the community surpassed its
initial economic objective, which was the creation of a common market.
As seen from the criteria, the main intentions of the Treaty of Maastricht
were as follows:
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1) To reinforce the independence of the institutions,
2) To strengthen the effectiveness of the institutions,
3) To establish economic and monetary unions,
4) To expand the Community’s social dimension,
5) To launch a widespread foreign and security policy
These policies intended to lift the barriers for the movement of people, goods,
services, and capital, to preserve common policies on agriculture, trade, and
regional development, and to ensure stability in justice and home affairs.

Motives behind the Union
The combination of various factors contributed to the formation of the European
Union. With a quick glance at the European history, we see that Europe hosted
many kinds of violence that included dictatorships, two world wars, rebellions,
occupations, and invasions. Leaving behind the ashes, deaths, and the ruined
countries after the Second World War, there was a deep longing for the
establishment of an environment that would allow countries to improve and
prosper as a unit. In short, due to a heavy reaction against the violence in the
continent and the desire for peace, the political climate favored a continental unity
that could maintain the harmony in Europe.
The aftermath of The Second World War and the gathering round of the allied
powers’ soldiers in Berlin streets were not long before the breakout of suspicion
between the allied forces. At the time, Winston Churchill, the prime minister of
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UK, explained the situation as the increasing distance between eastern and
western European countries due to the increased Soviet influence over the Eastern
Europe. The situation then turned into “The Cold War”, a war that was against a
possible Soviet domination and communism. The Cold War tension ever
increased starting from the late 1940s to 1960s with regard to the fear of the
possible expansion of Soviets combined with the drawing of the “iron curtain”
between the Eastern and Western European countries by the Soviets. Particularly
after the tension in Cold War reached a climax with the nuclear threats by both
sides, it became vital for the western European countries to build their shield. This
common shield, allowed the countries in the western part of Europe to integrate
themselves into a unit, later to be called as the European Union.
The political willingness of these countries and their desire for an economic
development were also two crucial reasons behind the creation of the European
Union. Following the Second World War, political and economic teamwork for
restoration of the economies replaced the European economic and political
competition that preceded the two world wars. Furthermore, there were concrete
steps towards a cooperation and progress as a unit such as International Monetary
Fund (IMF), General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and most
importantly The Marshall Plan. The Organization for European Economic
Corporation (OEEC), which later on turned into Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD), established in an attempt to finance the
post-world war renovation of Europe, came into existence as a feature of the
Marshall Plan.
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In conclusion, reacting against the overall violence and Soviet dominance, Europe
had a desire for peace, and had the willingness both politically and economically
to achieve it under a unification process. Consequently, as the motives behind
were so mature, the formation of the Union should be brought into existence
without any doubt.

Current Financial Situation of the EU

The current worldwide financial crisis seems as a unique one when the period
since the Second World War has been taken into account. The Great Depression
was not only a point of reference, but also it served as a great lesson with respect
to the policy mistakes done by governments and central banks. When compared to
the U.S. Government during the Great Depression, European states at the time did
not opt for protectionism as much, which was an economic policy that controlled
the trade between states through methods like tariffs on imported goods and
quotes. It therefore showed the coordination of the European countries in their
domestic markets during a crisis.
In the early phases, the crisis appeared as a clear liquidity deficiency within
financial institutions as they were having short-term problems. During this stage,
the ever-increasing number of people in Europe who could not pay their shortterm debts was regarded as a problem for these financial institutions; however, a
crisis that would devastate Europe was not foreseen. This view completely
changed by the collapse of a main investment bank, Lehman Brothers, in
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September 2008. iNext thing the Europe knows, confidence in the market
disintegrated, investors liquidated their accounts and stock markets collapsed.
Subsequently, the EU markets faced the biggest crisis since 1930’s. The real GDP
of the EU contracted as never before with 4%. Due to the negligible adjustments
in the industry and low demand, although there are signs of a recovery, the
process is expected to be sluggish.

Chapter 2: Evaluation

A General Overview of the Turkish Economy

Throughout history, countries such as Ottomans, Romans, and Americans
achieved to establish property rights, a sense of justice, democratic approach
towards people, encouragement for technological innovations, liberal reforms and
a quick re-adaptation period to the fast changing worldwide conditions. The
nations that achieved these goals faced high macroeconomic growth rates and
created sustainable welfare that lasted for decades. As soon as the Ottoman
Empire was not able to keep up with these pre-requisites of durable economic
growth, it slowly broke down and the world’s history faced the fall of one of the
biggest empires in the world. The limited capital resources in order to invest in a
brighter future slowly melt down due to the weaknesses in the social law. Finally,
after being defeated in the First World War, Ottoman Empire passed its tradition
of external debt to the newborn Turkish Republic.
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Following the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire, the new leadership
under Mustafa Kemal Ataturk aimed at rebuilding the Turkish economy starting
from 1923. Initially, the new regime was not interested in the economic or
financial stability; however, the main concern was hunger and possible
destruction of public law and order that could damage human capital in return.
In the early years of the Turkish Republic, although roughly 82% of the
population was engaged in agriculture, which formed 67% of the national income,
industry could only provide the essential needs for families that were involved.ii
There were not more than 220 tractors in the country. However, it was not only
the domestic problems like the lack of resources that created obstacles for the
establishment of economic welfare in Turkey but also the global economic
problems like the crash of the markets in the United States in 1929 stimulated
this. The Great Depression in the U.S. boosted the external debt. As soon as
economies started the process of healing themselves, the social unrest in Europe
led to the Second World War. Therefore, domestic and international
circumstances prevented the establishment of strong economic conditions and
basis in Turkey.
The 1950s may be considered as the first decade in which Turkey had the
potential to make a progress financially. However, due to the military coup that
took place in the following decade, Turkey could not maintain a financial
stability. Under the dominance of the army, enough capital was hoarded to make a
smooth transition to financial stability. This time; however, the first and second
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oil price shocks during the 1970s were the reasons why Turkey borrowed money
from outside, mainly from Europe.
Throughout the 1980’s, the policies that aimed to have a trade surplus (by
exporting more than the import rates) that were designed to lead to a high growth
appeared to have disadvantages for the economy. These liberalization-based
policies created a major financial crisis in 1983. However, the economy caught up
fast and Turkey faced high growth patterns in the following decade as Turgut
Ozal took hold of the office and extended the liberalization policy. Economic
liberalization gave birth to another problem: dollarization. Leaving behind a
traditional regime-directed economy, that was relatively isolated from the exterior
markets, former Prime Minister then President, Turgut Ozal, started to open up
the horizon for the expansion of the economy in the 1980s. This paved the road
for the signing of a customs union with the European Union in 1995. During the
90s Turkey was undergoing high inflation and boom-and-bust cycles that revealed
the coming of a severe economic crisis. One of the main international financial
establishments, IMF (International Monetary Fund) hosted Turkey many times for
the nation’s external debt problems. Finally, the curtains were closed with a
bottomless financial collapse in 2001 and the Turkish economy closed the decade
at its worst.

Improvement of The Turkish Economy in the last Decade
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Turkey’s economy started to make a strong progress since the 2001
downturn due to solid fiscal and monetary policies and financial modifications
supported by the IMF. Currently, the Turkish economy has been in a transition
process from a highly agriculture-dependent and intense industry state to a more
expanded economy with increasingly embracing large and globalized sectors. The
Nation’s economy achieved a growth of 6.0% every year from 2002 and 2007,
achieving one of the highest growth rates in the world. In this five-year period,
inflation has shrunk; interest rates have fallen to normal levels, the volatile
currency has become more stable, and Turkey’s major problem, the government
debt, dropped down to manageable levels (39.5% of the overall GDP in 2008).iii
However, due to the fast growing economy, the trade deficit increased into 5.6%
of the overall GP in 2008. As the markets crashed towards the end of 2008, the
growth naturally contracted to 1.1% while the economy diminished by 4.7%.iv In
2010, the growth rate improved up to 8.2%, while the government continued to
implement reforms, adopt a strict fiscal policy, and secure monetary policies of
the Independent Central Bank (TIB) in order to maintain economic growth and
stability.
As stated previously, since 1995 Turkey has been a member state of the
customs union of the European Union. This association helped to increase the
trade between Turkey and other EU member states although Turkey maintains its
large trade deficit tradition. Currently, the European Union is Turkey’s major
trading partner, despite the fact that Turkey is still delaying to fulfill various
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requirements. The customs union consists of trade in manufactured products
including the position of Turkey according to the EU policies concerning
technical regulation of products, competition, and Intellectual Property Law.v
Pertaining to product groupings, Turkey continues to import technologic
equipment (automotive products, machinery...) chemicals, iron, and steel
regularly from the EU as well as agricultural products including cereal. Key
exports of Turkey to the EU market include textiles and cloth, machinery,
transport equipment.vi
At record setting levels of growth, Turkish economy is regarded to ignore
the financial crisis in Europe fallout although some impacts are felt by Turkey.
Despite a slowdown warning of European experts in the close future, Turkish
Deputy Prime Minister, Ali Babacan, claimed that Turkish economy was able to
dodge the recent impacts of the Eurozone crisis. However since EU is the biggest
partner of Turkey, and the two sides are linked closely through Customs Union,
Turkey felt some of the effects as Eurozone tilted towards recession. As Sarp
Kalkan, a financial analyst at TEPAV stated “Turkish exports to the EU stood at
56% before the crisis in 2008, but currently they are approximately 47%.”
Although the overall impact was not quite big, due to a small decrease in Turkish
exports to the EU and a rapid increase in Turkish exports to Middle East and
North Africa.

16
Finally, with Turkish economic growth outpacing that of China’s in the
first half of 2011, Turkish leaders strongly believe that Turkish economy will
move from 17th biggest economy in the world to top ten by 2023.

Possible Costs of EU memberships to Turkey

For candidate countries, the main purpose of EU membership should be based on
rational political and economic objectives. A logical approach of a candidate
country would be to expect greater economic stability and economic convergence
with the industrialized countries. From an economical perspective, it is totally
rational to assume that the road to growth will be supported by EU with monetary
and financial transfers as a result of full time membership. However, there will be
some costs as well. Every group has its own rules and guidelines that the newcomers have to follow. This process will therefore be dependent upon the
availability of resources and investment conditions. So what are the main costs
that Turkey fears of?
Besides accepting economic conditions in Copenhagen, implementing the whole
legal body of acquis communautaire, will not be easy and will have some costs
particularly for the applicants that are relatively at lower economic levels, which
is the case for the new EU members or candidates. The never-ending list of
integration measures noted in the report by the Commission will take many years
until Turkey adequately adopts the acquis. The EU will be governing the
implementation process of legal corpus and accordingly, Turkey will have short

17
term economic problems in the areas of agricultural policy, regional policy and
environmental and social standards.
Turkey, investing nearly 1.5 billion US $ in Central and Eastern European
countries, is one of the biggest sources of foreign direct investment in the Balkan
region. If the EU accepts Turkey as a member, Turkish businesses require
restructuring and most of the public economic enterprises (SEE’s) would need to
be privatized and liberalized. This is a major fear faced by the political party
running the government because the privatization can eventually cause political
and social tension. This decision would not only be highly criticized by other
political parties but also by the public.

In addition, during the privatization

process, the government may run into economic problems such as the allocation
of money or the amount needed to meet the price of the enterprise.
Another point that Turkey has been in fear of, after accessing into the European
Union, is the potential changes that will take place in its agricultural sector.
Agriculture is still an essential sector of the Turkish economy. According to the
European Commission’s Agriculture and Rural development titled article, in 2010
it represented 10.1% of the total GDP and 24.7% of Turkish employment. Also
noted by Moustakis, “the most efficient working sector in the country and has a
compatible high standard in the agricultural world market...”vii Thus, one of the
biggest fears of Turkey is the import of inefficiency from EU through the CAP
(Common Agricultural Policy), once Turkey is a full time member.
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Fears of the EU from Turkish Accession
This section will try to analyze the main economic concerns and doubts of the
European Union about the possible Turkish membership within the EU. Turkey’s
large size, poor macro situation, low contribution to Union’s internal market,
costly budget implications after membership and migration from Turkey are the
main fears whereas, low foreign investment to the country and its accession to the
internal market are thought to have minimal effects on the EU economy as a result
of a possible Turkish accession into the EU.
Size
Many consider Turkey as a weak economy when compared to its large
population. Turkey is a big; however a poor country, as well. Based on these two
facts, opponents to Turkish membership believe that Turkey will cost too much
financially and will have too much power with respect to its population. Although
size alone will not be the sole ground to make a decision for its future, yet it will
be a significant and relevant actor in managing Turkish membership.
According to the critics, Turkish accession would not only have a small positive
impact on the much larger EU market, but relatively weaker Turkish economy
would also require financial assistance. Furthermore, at the political level, a weak
economy with around a population of seventy million would play the second
biggest role in designing economic policies: how fair would it be in the eyes of
many Europeans?
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Table 1 points out UN predictions for Turkey, the EU member states with
population over
5 million, and
total

EU

population from
2030 to 2050.
Today, Turkey
has a population
of
approximately
72 million.
Until

the
possible

membership
date of 2015, Turkey will reach an estimated population of 82 million, likely to
surpass Germany due to its decreasing population. In 2025, ten years later, Turkey
will be the largest state in the Union with its population of 87 million. Meanwhile,
Turkey is not regarded as a European country by most of the Europeans. The
difference between the largest members of the Union by population such as
Germany, France, Italy and the UK is that these countries also have the strongest
economies. Unlike the case of Turkey, political and economic dominance go
together.
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Finally, Turkey has obvious regional variation illustrating the rural/urban
division with its deprived regions in eastern Anatolia. Income disparity is as much
as one fifth per head when compared to Turkey’s richest parts, which is Marmara
region. Dealing with the widespread poverty and regional inequality is Turkey’s
one of the largest economic challenge.
Macro Situation
Although Turkey has a relatively smaller sized economy that would hardly
damage the internal European market and the Euro, serious financial crises it
faced in its recent past like the one in 2001 are great examples of financial
instability. Table three shows the key economic variables of Turkey right after the
2001 financial collapse.
Such volatility has been a
concern especially when it
comes to accepting a state
that

exhibits

economic
Although

weak
patterns.

adopting

the

common currency, Euro, by a country is possible in some years after the
membership, it is certainly not the EU’s interest to admit a country that has
financial recessions in its modern history. As stated in Copenhagen criteria,
candidate countries are expected to keep up with ever tightening internal market
regulations and have functioning economies. Economies which are vulnerable to
regular financial crises do not meet these criteria.
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Although European’s fear from such adverse effects, it is quite noteworthy that
Turkey has rebounded from the 2001 crisis in an impressive manner. Since 2010,
Turkey has the highest real GDP growth rate by 9.0% and 7.5% respectivelyviii.
European analysts consider this growth as healthy within Turkey’s potential,
within an evaluation of the ongoing monetary reforms at macro and micro level.
Another macroeconomic fear Europeans have in their minds in relation to
Turkey’s accession talks is the inflation. Inflation dropped significantly from 45%
in 2002 as seen in table 3, to 8.7% in 2010ix. Turkey is one of the few emerging
economies that had high inflation levels once and managed to stay away from
hyperinflation. Although Turkish economy witnessed single digit inflation for the
first time in thirty years, economic observers believe that it is critical for Turkey
to preserve the situation and make it sustainable.
Turkey’s consistency is questioned when it comes to external debt. With almost
89% of its GDP in 2002, external debt (public and private debt owed to
nonresidents repayable in foreign currency, goods, or services) is still an unsolved
problem on the Turkish side. Turkey’s foreign debt burden is greater than any
other EU entrants or EU candidate states. Because much of the debts is short-run
government debt (about 70% being cumulated current account deficits since 1963
accounting for 40 billion US$) and is expressed in foreign currency, Turkey is
having a very volatile market, and the Turkish economy is vulnerable to market
sentiment and exchange rate fluctuationsx. External debt and flight of Turkish
capital to legal looking financial institutions has been a key feature of its poor
financial performance in its modern history.
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In the meantime, Turkey was criticized highly by the European member states
because of the issues with the IMF. According to most of the EU states, the
motives that have driven the Turkish reforms are the IMF loans and conditionality
since the 2001 crisis. Although IMF pushed for monetary cutback and structural
reforms along with alterations in the banking sector seen particularly crucial to
diminish risks for additional problems, Turkey did not adopt a successor IMF
program in 2005 and has declined to work with the IMFxi. Just before Turkey
started to face high levels of real GDP growth, European observers believed that
both state and non-state banks needed fundamental reforms. Still today, Turkey is
being criticized for different problems that it is said to have in its banking system
and this makes the accession process harder.

Immigration
Aside from direct financial implications, another feared outcome from a possible
Turkish accession has been the immigration case. As Jurgen Gerhards and Silke
Hans interpret the data from Eurobarometer, most EU citizens are confident that
accession would result in an increased immigration from Turkey to more
industrialized EU countries. Furthermore, 76.3% of 22,480 EU citizens agreed
with the idea that “Turkey's accession could risk favoring immigration to more
developed countries in the EU.” It is regarded as a realistic fear since Turkish
citizens would have the right to freely travel within the EU following a flexible
transition period of up to seven years.

23
According to the EU member states Turkish immigration could have adverse
effects on some specific parts of the labor market due to increased competition.
Although not every single EU state would be affected to the same extent, specific
countries attract immigration particularly the ones that are more economically
advanced like EU-15. As observed with the 2004 enlargement, by which 10 new
states joined, migration became a sensitive political and economic issue, in public
opinion who are strictly against it. Eventually, the EU decided to allow a flexible
transition period maximum for seven years.
A second point that the legal immigration could affect the EU labor markets is the
countries with already high unemployment rates would be worse off since most of
these immigrants would be looking for jobs along with the citizens of the country
itself. Although countries that have low unemployment rates may welcome the
immigration in order to resolve labor shortage problems, since unemployment is a
lot bigger problem than lack of labor, immigration is therefore believed to have
negative economic implications in aggregate.

Budgetary Implications of Turkish Accession
Turkey has made a legitimate progress since the last decade with its GDP per
capita (GDP on a purchasing power parity basis divided by population) 6,200
US$ in 1999 up to 12,300 US$ in 2010.xii Additionally, its economy grew an
average of 6.0% per year between 2002 and 2007. During this period, inflation
along with interest rates dropped while the currency stabilized and the
government debt decreased to manageable levels (39.5% of GDP in 2008 from
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73.1% in 2002xiii). However, according to the EU, when considering every
economic indicator, despite all the recent significant economic developments,
Turkey would be one of the least economically developed country among the
Member states, including the groups of countries that joined the EU in 2004 and
2007 waves. Structural convergence aimed through the catching up of the
economies is one of the main goals of the EU. Therefore, to balance out these
economic differences, Turkish accession would be supplemented by transfer
payments from the EU citizens’ budgets. This is obviously regarded as a negative
economic implication that arises from the Turkish accession to the European
Union. Citizens complain from being unemployed already, and therefore do not
agree on “paying” by accepting Turkey as a member.
Remembering the negotiations with the 10 new EU member states, not only
current policy rules, but also traditional politics and intense disputes control the
budget discussions between the “givers” and “takers” in the EU. Table 4 from
(Hughes 2004) shows the budget deals done for new member states. The EU
Council assessed each country’s structural fund requirements and CAP eligibility
(Common Agricultural Policy) to determine the right amount of payment needed
for each country. In addition, EU Council limited the structural payments for ten
states that joined in 2004 to 4% of GDP. Estimates show that funds to Turkey
vary between 5.6 to 24.6 billion Euros per year, which is nearly equal to those of
the ten member states in 2004.xiv Therefore, the acceptance of Turkey is feared
since it is estimated to have the costs of ten EU countries.
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Although a significant amount of budget transfer is necessary, it is quite difficult
to estimate the net budgetary implications following the Turkish integration, due
to uncertainty of the future of the two economies. However, a rational way the
financial analysts estimate the budgetary implications of Turkish membership is
to utilize the financial packages the EU provided in the 2004 enlargement.
Assuming a Turkish membership in 2015, Hughes (2004) expects a 10.5 billion
euro worth of gross budgetary transfer from EU to Turkey in 2015. Following
such estimation, according to SPO (2004) Turkey would transfer 4.9 billion euro
in 2015. As a result, net budgetary transfer from EU to Turkey equals to 5.6
billion euros (10.5-4.9=5.6), out of EU citizens’ pockets.xv
Table 4: The EU Financial Perspective for the EU 25

Employment
In addition to macroeconomic affects, Turkish accession may have negative
implications at the individual level as well. According to Gabel and Palmer
(1995), market liberalization regarding European integration is likely to have
negative effects for low skilled workers. For instance, workers with low skilled
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human capital that have a precarious position in the labor market are on the spot.
Also confirmed by Hooghe and Marks (2005), EU enlargements bring along
negative economic consequences for low-skilled people by making them easily
replaceable with the immigrant workers. This also includes unemployed people
who are threatened by immigrant workers who have lower expectations and lesser
demands from their employers, and relatively lower costs of working. Although
increased immigration does not necessarily risk high skilled workers job positions
by lowering the prices, low skilled workers of the EU 15 will be highly affected
due to mass amount of either unemployed or unsatisfied Turkish people who are
willing to migrate in order to find jobs or improve their working conditions.
European Integration Consortium (2000) reports similar findings regarding the
EU fears of free movement in an enlarged European Union. Concentrating on
Austria and Germany, the EIC believes that based on the empirical knowledge of
migration impact on labor, the increase of foreigners will affect the wages and
employment in the host countries. In addition, previously an increase share of
foreigners in a country by only one percent reduced the wages by 0.25% in
Austria and 0.65% in Germany while the risk of a person being unemployed
increased by 0.8% in Austria and 0.2% in Germany.xvi

The Customs Union Agreement, Trade and the Internal Market

Turkey and the EU benefit from a deep trade relationship since Turkey and EU
were linked by a Customs Union agreement in 31 December 1995. As mentioned
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before in this project, Customs Union agreement does not cover fundamental
economic areas like agriculture. Therefore the EU has been in an attempt to do a
cost-benefit analysis of a possible Turkish accession. The EU financial analysts
believe that economic benefits the EU could collect from bilateral trade from
Turkey is small-not worth it. In more detail, Turkish exports to the EU account
only for about 3.3% of the total EU imports (equivalent to €47 billion), while EU
exported 4.3% of total EU (€53 billion) in 2007xvii. In addition, approximately
70% of Turkish agricultural exports already go into the internal market of the EU
without tariffs or any other restrictions. Hence, taking the Customs Union to the
next level by accepting Turkey as a member is not regarded by the EU as a boost
to the EU economy through the trade channel.
Customs Union agreement that was ratified between the EU and Turkey in 1995
was expected to bring trade and economic benefits to both sides. In addition,
many observers believed that through this agreement Europeans would be able to
predict their likely future benefits after a possible Turkish membership, when
Turkey could access the internal market fully (free movement of people,
agriculture, and services are excluded in the Customs Union). Unfortunately, the
European side has been disappointed at the operation of the Customs Union by
the Turkish side. Although trade barriers were removed, bureaucratic barriers and
other non-tariff barriers have remained as obstacles for a closer future partnership.
Until 2005, Customs Union did not lead to any apparent FDI changes as well.
Starting from 2005 and lasting in 2008 FDI flows to Turkey has dramatically
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increased from (2.8 billion US $ in 2004 to 10 billion US $ in 2005); however,
once again the consistency of this rise is doubted by many Europeansxviii.
Economic implications of Turkish accession into the EU have also been estimated
by the Netherlands Bureau or Economic Policy Analysisxix.According to the
Bureau, initially there would be an approximate 34% increase in bilateral trade.
Then, they estimate the effects of an imaginary Turkish accession in 2010 in 2025
by using a complete simulation excluding the FDI affects, technology spillovers
and EU budget transfers. Results illustrate that accession to the internal market
would generate a 0.8% GDP growth for Turkey, 1.4% rise in consumption and an
8.1% increase in exports. Turkey benefits most from the textile and clothing. On
the other hand, the implications on the European side are much smaller when
compared to a relatively smaller size of the Turkish economy. According to the
estimations by the Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis, the EU 15
faces an increase of 0.1% in consumption and 0.2% in exports along with a 5.07
billion US$. As predicted further, as a result of the Turkish accession, the ten
member states that joined the union in 2004 are expected to face a growth in
consumption by 0.2% and export volume by 0.3%. In total, according to the
NBEPA simulations, Turkish influence on the EU GDP is too small to register for
one decimal place.
Turkish accession to the internal market concerns the European Union at the
policy enforcement level as well. The memberships of central and eastern
European countries have already transformed the EU from mainly industrial core
rich countries to a more diverse group which consists of many transitioning
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countries. Therefore, economic and monetary policies severely change in order to
maintain internal coherencexx. This affects the implementation of internal market
regulations and coordination of countries in achieving specific goals. When
industrial countries race to increase the level of domination in the market with
their advanced technologies, transitioning countries must first go through a
successful convergence process. Therefore the concern is whether a more
heterogeneous economic group with the accession of Turkey would decrease the
competition which may harm the EU in return.

The Problem of Foreign Direct Investment

While Turkey began to launch trade policies and started observing its
exports more carefully (since it has a trade surplus), foreign direct investments
appeared to be very low. Before 2000, only less than a billion dollars’ worth
foreign direct investment flew to Turkey. However, since 2000, FDI climbed
increasingly and mounted in 2007 with 22 billions of dollars then fell down
during the recent global crisis.xxi
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Figure 1: Foreign Direct Investments (FDI) inflows to Turkey in billion current
US-$, 2000-2009

As seen from the Figure, the entire amount of the FDI Turkey received
from 1980up to 2003 was mainly as debt payments or portfolio investments.
However, from 2003 to 2006 a total of 25.5 US$ foreign investment has flown in
Turkey. This unpredicted pattern existed until 2008, when the economic crisis hit
the world. Since 2003, most of the foreign investments to Turkey were from
Europe. This indicates a remarkable change of perception by the European
investors towards Turkey. The fact that foreign direct investment increased
tremendously without the EU membership is a disincentive for the EU countries

31
to accept Turkey as a member anymore. In other words, the issue is Turkish
membership is not expected to change this increasing foreign capital inflow
significantly and predicted to have minimal positive implications for the EU
investors and the EU economy in general.
Table 2. Citizens' Attitudes towards Different Propositions with Regard to
Turkey (%)
Support

N

1. Turkey's accession would help rejuvenate an ageing European
36.7% 20,486
population
2. Turkey's accession to the EU would strengthen security in this
40.6% 21,996
region
3. Turkey partly belongs to Europe by its history

50.3% 22,497

4. Turkey partly belongs to Europe by its geography

64.7% 23,129

5. The cultural differences between Turkey and the EU Member
68.9% 22,744
States are too significant to allow it to join the EU
6. Turkey's accession could risk favoring immigration to more
developed countries in the EU

76.3% 22,480

7. To join the EU, Turkey will have to significantly improve the
89.5% 22,574
state of its economy
8. In order to join the EU, Turkey will have to systematically
respect human rights

93.6% 23,609

Source: Authors' own calculations based on Eurobarometer data.xxii
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Note: Percentage of those who said ‘tend to agree’ or ‘totally agree’ as opposed to
those who ‘tend to disagree’ or ‘totally disagree’. ‘Don't know’ responses were
excluded from the analysis.
Chapter 3: Analysis
Positions of Relevant Actors
Germany
Germany was among the main proponents of Turkish accession under the SPD
party led by Gerhard Schroder and demonstrated a new approach to EU-Turkey
negotiations. However, as the CDU joined the SPD for a coalition government
following the 2005 elections, position of Germany changed noticeably. The CDU
has always been one of the biggest adversaries of full time Turkish membership
for all political, social and economic reasons, while the Chancellor, Angela
Merkel supported the unique “privileged partnership” with majority of her party
supporting this idea. In contrast, SPD is still a strong advocate of Turkish
accession but is criticized by senior figures such as the former Chancellor Helmut
Schmidt. Due to the given uncertainty resulting from the coalition of both parties,
there is no single strict policy towards Turkish membership and all the options
remain possible. Among the German population, 12% of the public support the
Turkish accession whereas 66% are against it.
France
During the presidency of Jacques Chirac, the French policy towards Turkish
accession was somewhat vague. Chirac was in favor of Turkish accession leading
up to the accession talks; however, faced a large opposition from the right parties.
Throughout his electoral campaign, the current French president, Nicholas
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Sarkozy, clearly stated his bitter opposition to Turkey’s accession into the EU
several times. French public fear and guardianship against a large Turkish
immigration of workers is the backbone of this strong opposition. Furthermore,
Sarkozy offered establishing a Mediterranean Union that would include Turkey
but details were not defined later.
United Kingdom
Tony Blair, the former prime minister of the UK was one of the main supporters
of Turkish membership. Taking the charge after Mr. Blair, Gordon Brown stated
in numerous occasions that he was supportive of Turkish accession. Since the
British policy is aligned with that of U.S., it sees this expansion as widening the
range of EU rather than isolating Turkey from the West. Up to now, the rightist
parties such as the conservative party are united for pro Turkey enlargement, due
to UK’s long-established transatlantic alignment. Blair emphasized the
significance of Turkish membership by visiting Turkey and being the first British
Prime Minister to visit Turkey in nearly two decades. Brown also got together
with Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan in late 2007, and convinced the media on
the British confidence in Turkey by signing a UK-Turkish strategic alliance
Agreement.
Greece
Greece which was one of the main adversaries of Turkish accession changed its
position considerably in recent decade. After the continuous pressure from the EU
and the US and since the 1999 earthquake that struck both countries terribly,
Greece stepped away from being an ardent adversary to a more somewhat logical
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observer. Since then, Greece tolerated numerous frustrations regarding Cyprus
and Aegean F-16 battles; however, sustained its position on Turkish accession. It
can be claimed that Greek government believes the bilateral problems would be
solved easier under the roof of the EU. Kostas Karamanlis summarized the
Athens’ approach on Turkish membership “full compliance, full accession.”
However, it should be noted that Greek public stance is intensely opposed to EU
enlargement by Turkey; a recent public poll revealed that 25% supported while
45% were against it.
Cases of Romania and Bulgaria
In this section I will primarily mention how the Central and Eastern European
Countries (mainly focusing on Bulgaria and Romania) are hitting the ground
running as they catch up with their European peers. Then I will focus on Bulgaria
and Romania and discuss some negative implications of their integration within
the EU.
Latest EU members, Romania and Bulgaria immediately showed an attempt to
close the economic gap with the European Union members. Despite the obstacles
on their way, such as their domestic problems within the states and the global
financial crisis, healthy investment growth and economic progression make the
transition a less painful one for these two countries. Being the largest economy in
the world since the fourth enlargement, European Union accepted Romania and
Bulgaria who became official members on January 1, 2007. With the fifth and
latest enlargement, Romania and Bulgaria contributed some 30 million people to
the EU, increasing the population to almost 500 million people.
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Romanian and Bulgarian prime ministers have indicated that they are interested in
accomplishing the remaining tasks identified by the EU Commission. According
to the monitoring findings, two countries were demanded to intensify their battle
against corruption and improve their judicial reform procedure.
Although Romanian and Bulgarian economies vary in terms of their size,
industrialization levels, and monetary performance, they do have some similar
macroeconomic
features. They
both faced a
major
immigration
from their
countries in the
early 90s due to
economic
problems after
the collapse of
the Soviet
Union.
Nowadays, unemployment problem still exists and they both lack high-skilled
labor in several sectors.
Another evidence of convergence of Central and Eastern European Countries
including Romania and Bulgaria can be found on the Maastricht Convergence
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Criteria presented in the article European Economy by Fritz Breuss.xxiii The
changes in these two countries are significant when following their accession to
the European Internal Market. In Bulgaria, the Gross debt of general government
decreased from 18.2 % to 13.8 % of GDP and the budget balance increased from
0.1 % to 3.3% of GDP. Similar effects can be seen in Romania. Although the
decreases in budget balance and increases in inflation rate should have been
exaggerated due to the global crisis, accession to the EU market has diminished
the negative implications. We have to keep in mind that these two countries have
prospered in such a short time and currently have not accessed into the European
Monetary Union yet.
The latest EU enlargement broadened the single market of the EU as well as the
Schengen area. Bulgaria and Romania have not fully integrated into the internal
market of the EU and they have not fulfilled all the pre-requisites of the Single
European Market (SEM); however, these two new members benefited evidently
after their participation in the SEM.
Furthermore, Romania and Bulgaria extended their trade with their peers. In fact,
the two new member states started trading with themselves as well. The new
members also benefited as the former EU members have passed on their trade
flows to the new member states. According to Breuss (2008)xxiv, the change in
trade between 1993 and 2007 in Bulgaria and Romania is +7.7 and +24.6 in
percentage points respectively. Industrialized members of the EU have also
benefited significantly from the Bulgarian and Romanian EU accessions. If we
take a look at the following table, we can see that the exports to Bulgaria and
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Romania have increased tremendously, +7.7% to Bulgaria, and 24.6% to Romania
respectively.

Following the collapse of the Soviet Union the Central Eastern European
Countries started trading and receiving foreign direct investment mainly from the
industrialized European countries. Especially after the latest EU enlargements, the
CEECs appeared to be a great market for Western European companies.
Specifically, Austrian businesses and more so German companies whom had a
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long history within the area exploited this emerging situation. Dutch, Austrian and
German investors are the most noticeable source of foreign capital inflow for
CEECs. In particular, Bulgaria and Romania attracted the major share of FDI
during their integration into the European Single Market as they adopted the
policy of privatization.
The global financial state had negative implications on the new member’s
economies’. The economic crisis limited the growth potential of new members
including Bulgaria and Romania. The International Monetary Fund, the OECD
along with the European Commission has observed downward financial trends
towards the end of 2008.
The following table designed by Fritz Breuss in the article An Evaluation of the
EU’s Fifth Enlargement With special focus on Bulgaria and Romania illustrates
the effects of integration on the key indicators of each economy. It is clear to see
that both Bulgaria and Romania benefited from the membership.

xxv
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The Case of Bulgaria
Bitter reforms along with EU support assisted Bulgaria out from the hopeless
tangle in the 1990s. Today, Bulgarian financial growth doubles the average of
EU. In 2005, Bulgaria’s real GDP grew at 5.5%, in 2006; this was 6.1% whereas
the EU-25 growth was 1.7% and 2.8% respectively. Besides investment,
consumption growth at 6.4% was regarded as the main reason behind the
economic progress.xxvi Although Bulgaria started to catch up, it still has a long
way ahead in order to converge fully with rest of its peers. Since the accession,
the unemployment has also been decreasing steadily. Although unemployment is
still higher than the EU average, it decreased from 9.3 % in 2006 July to 5.2% in
November 2008. Following the EU accession, Bulgaria’s most glowing
accomplishment has been the stabilization of its economy. Investor confidence
rose rapidly as Bulgaria started to pay attention to the findings of European Union
Monitoring Mission. Meanwhile, a fast ageing and decreasing population makes it
harder for unemployment to increase in the youth population. Head of the DG
ECFIN Unit for economic matters, Peter Grasmann stated that the unemployment
is estimated to drop below 7% later in 2013xxvii. Additionally, According to EFCN
autumn forecast evaluations, Bulgaria’s future seems bright as they claimed
“Economic growth is expected to accelerate further…as strong investment growth
and ongoing enterprise restructuring continue…”xxviii

However, Bulgaria will

also have to face the remaining membership challenges such as adopting the
reforms for euro entry and making sure the Structural Funds provided by the EU
are used efficiently.
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By achieving the desired level of stability, Bulgaria is not close to being an elite
level economy. One of the features of fast growing economies is the ever growing
trade deficit. Right after the accession, due to the elimination of trade barriers,
exports from industrialized countries to Bulgaria increased dramatically. In 2008,
imports were 34.88% of GDP while exports were floating around 22.51%.
However, unlike Romania, Bulgaria recently started to export more than it
imports. Since Bulgarian exports grew at a higher pace than imports the trade
deficit of Bulgaria’s foreign deficit shrank by 64% in January/August 2011xxix.

The Case of Romania
Romanian economy faced so many ups and downs in the 1990s, and only since
2000s the economy proved to be more stable. Nowadays, Romania is on the way
towards the end of a financial rebound. Since 2007, the EU provided Romania
with a Structural fund worth 20 billion Euros along with an agricultural
development fund worth 13 billion Euros. These funds were intended to enhance
infrastructure, improve living standards, increase the competitiveness of
companies, and therefore create more job opportunities to fight with
unemployment. Establishment of Customs Union and accession into the EU
internal Market opened Romanian businesses up to nearly half billion consumers
without barriers on trade, interest on capital, and limits on travel of labor. In
addition, due to high level of European market competition, Romanian firms
reached another level as a result of European market competition.
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However, despite the EU support, during the following years after the accession,
Romania could not get the most out of the membership yet. Some negative effects
are the trade balance worsening, weak competition of Romanian firms, expensive
agricultural products, and growing of budget deficit.
Romania’s adoption of the EU Common Customs Tariff and the Generalized
System of Preferences has generated anxieties regarding the rise of imports and
therefore worsening of the trade balance. In fact, trade deficit grew since 2006 by
46%. On numerical terms, the deficit between Romania and non-EU countries
decreased from 34.43% of the total deficit in 2007 to 29.64% following the
accession and to 22.78% in 2008. While, the deficit between Romania and the EU
countries turned out to be approximately 46% after the accessionxxx. Although
trade deficit with non-EU countries decreased, the trade deficit between Romania
and the other EU countries increased more than the decrease on the non-European
side.
The immediate effects of Romanian accession and implementation of Internal
Market acquis were negative since further investment was required, domestic
businesses could not compete with the EU companies, and this in turn caused
exports to decrease and trade balance to deteriorate. Imports increased 11.2%
more than exports, resulting in a 44.4% bigger trade deficit compared to 2006. xxxi
Furthermore, the trade deficit kept rising in 2008 as exports increased only by
14.37% and imports increased by 10.48% from 2007 (since imports were bigger
than exports by 5.17%)xxxii.
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Implementation of the Common Agricultural Policy resulted with increased
agricultural prices as predicted due to huge agricultural product price difference
between Romania and EU member states. Therefore, Romania faced 1.5% price
increase in January 2007. According to Buletin statistic de preturi ianuarie 2008,
agricultural products were 24% more expensive in January 2008 than in January
2007xxxiii. Within a short period of time, Romania grew with one of the highest
rates in Europe.

Conclusion
Overall, similar to what would happen with Turkey, Bulgaria and Romania
benefited much more from the EU membership than core countries in the ratio of
20:1. In the close future, around 2020, Romania and Bulgaria are expected to face
1.5% GDP growth increase annually on average; however this is still not enough
to bring Romania and Bulgaria to an elite level of economy. Evaluations reveal
that new member states Bulgaria and Romania have already been able to benefit
strikingly as a result of their accession to the internal market of the EU, although
they have not been fully integrated. In addition, we cannot count out the shadows
of the international financial crisis on this rapid growth. The question of when
Romania is going to benefit fully from this accession depends on when it is going
to get rid of corruption and create a more stable environment that generates
economic growth. This is the way how Bulgaria prospered and if Turkey joins, it
is the way how Turkey will benefit: by creating a more stable environment for the
economy to operate smoothly.
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Benefits to the EU
Economic Implications of Homogenization of the Two Economies
How would a potential membership of Turkey affect the European Union?
Turkey has maintained inward oriented trade and advancement policies since the
World War II. After the Cyprus Peace Operation in 1974, the embargo that the
U.S imposed on the Turkish economy raised doubts in many European’s minds
about the possible future official economic relationship. Starting from the 1980s
Turkish economy started to open up with the liberalization of its trade.
Liberalization of trade not only strengthened its economic cooperation with the
EU but it also guided the way for the Customs Union agreement in 1995.
In spite of the economic collaboration between the European Union and Turkey,
some Europeans are unwilling to accept Turkey as a member of the EU for
several reasons.
Turkish membership will affect the economy of the European Union in many
ways. Migration, agriculture, and integration of trade will be the main advantages
of Turkish accession to the European Union. My analysis concerning the
economic implications of the possible Turkish accession to the European Union
will include three parts:
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Macroeconomic Effects as a result of Turkey’s accession to the Internal
Market

xxxiv

Turkey’s accession into the internal market
Turkish membership in the EU will allow the accession of Turkey into the
domestic market. This requires a full adoption of the EU law on the side of
Turkey. Accomplishing these goals goes through reforms, which may cause
Turkey to suffer from short run costs. In the long-run however, these reforms may
well shake the economies of both sides via strong trade relations. Certainly the
Turkish accession into the internal market will escalate the trade for various
reasons. First of all, administrative barriers on trade will be lifted or at least be
diminished to the levels that the EU countries have within each other. This would
cause less time delays, less formalities and provide many other opportunities at
the frontier. The formation of a single market due to Turkish accession will also
eliminate technical barriers on trade as both sides would agree upon technical
regulations and other guidelines. Although the EU and Turkey got rid of some
minimum technical requirements through customs union, it is clear that accession
would help to advance substantially. In addition, risk and uncertainty affiliated
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with politics and volatility within the economy will be reduced with the accession
of Turkey into the EU. In particular, political risk and macroeconomic instability
associated risk will likely be in a declining manner. Based on the estimations,
mutual trade between Turkey and the EU may increase by nearly 33% as Turkey
gets integrated within the EU as a member. According to the researchers, textile
and agriculture products will face the most increase.xxxv
Potential trade increase following the elimination of non-tariff barriers, revealed a
cost of non-accession into the internal market. Furthermore, a scenario created by
Lejour (2008) related with a Turkish accession into the internal market illustrates
interesting results for both sides. In this scenario, the authors assume that Turkey
grows with an average of 5% (although it grows with 9% currently), with a GDP
growth faster than that of EU by 2.5%. Then, the authors assume a removal of
trade barriers between the EU and Turkey and estimate the effects after twenty
years. According to the findings, Turkey is estimated to face an annual welfare
increase of 4.4.US$ and GDP increase by 1%. This is a result of integration into
the EU market, establishment of a more free trade and specialization. Although
the results are positive for EU member states, they are trivial in monetary terms,
whereas Turkish gain is significant. The main cause of the difference in benefit is
a big portion of Turkish exports flow to EU, while only a small fraction of
European exports flow to Turkey. Although EU faces an overall welfare gain, the
Central and Eastern European member states that were accepted in 2004 and 2007
experience a slight decrease in textile production due to the existence of a more
competitive environment after Turkish accession into the internal market of EU.
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Reforms and the Turkish Institutions
EU membership requirements and the process of accession into the EU facilitate
Turkish institutions to reform, and this will eventually affect the Turkish economy
in various ways. In fact, more efficient institutions and less corruption will
definitely inspire confidence in Turkey which would encourage more investment
in and further trade with Turkey. Estimations reveal significant results from the
improvement of Turkish institutions. For instance, if Turkey becomes as less
corrupt as Portugal on the Transparency International Corruption Perceptions
Index, overall Turkish trade would more than double. This would generate a GDP
growth of 5.6% in Turkish GDP and welfare increase by 28.2 billion US$. These
impacts are noticeably bigger than the effects of accession to the internal market.
Due to deeper bilateral trade relations, EU countries would benefit further as well,
experiencing a total increase of 8.5 billion US$ in private income, with
Netherlands benefiting from 7% of it.

Benefits to the European Union
As a result of a possible membership, Turkey may increase the size of the Union’s
market. A bigger market will spur growth and trade, and create job openings.
Advanced trade integration plays a major role in the Turkish economy. Since the
ratification of the customs union agreement with the European Union in 1995,
Turkey is a key trader in the union’s internal market for goods (though not in
labor market) and adopts significant reforms regardless of its possible
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membership. Customs union agreement allowed the travel of goods between two
entities without any customs control. In addition, it was one of the steps towards a
full Turkish accession into the EU. 1996 and onwards, Turkey and the EU
established a free trade area for products that were covered by the European Coal
and Steel Community. Therefore, throughout the recent years, Turkey has proved
that its integration at the European Union’s economy is at a high level.

xxxvi

Furthermore, the customs union agreement between Turkey and European Union
led to a creation of a legitimate trade partner, instead of diversion in trade, which
can be justified by looking at the ever-increasing Turkish share in the EU market.
The Customs Union already concerns the industrial goods. It suggests that there
would not be any additional benefits since this agreement cannot go further even
in the case of a full membership. On the other hand, the issue about getting rid of
customs duties does not take account of the trade of agricultural products.
Agricultural products will be excluded of customs obligations only when Turkey
shall be a full-time member. Turkey’s accession can generate an increasing
welfare in exchange of various agricultural products in the European Union.
When the foreign trade of Turkey with the EU is reviewed, Turkey has a trade
deficit with the EU in industrial goods, and has a surplus when it comes to the
agricultural products. Turkey’s higher export compared to its import from the EU
considering the existence of custom duties signifies that Turkey may well
contribute even more to the European trade under full accession. Therefore,
Turkish membership may bring full or at least some self-sufficiency to the EU as
the production of agricultural products that lead Turkish export such as seeds,
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corn, citric fruits eventually wind up in the market.xxxvii According to the
Common Agricultural Policy of the EU, self-sufficiency is an essential principle.
Moreover, in the case of Turkish accession, excess products produced by the EU,
especially the ones that Turkey lacks, would make Turkey an excellent market. As
stated by several Turkish market analysts, if Turkey becomes a full-time member
to the EU, the cream butter production will end since buying it from EU will be
cheaper due to EU’s vast stock of the product.xxxviii Although agricultural products
in bilateral trade take up just about 17% in Turkish export and 5% in import,
European Union would benefit from Turkish membership on the trade of the
agricultural products.
Agriculture is still one of the key properties of the Turkish economy. Similar to
the case other central and eastern European countries, like in the case of Poland
and Romania, a big bulk of the labor force is engaged in agriculture. Nearly one
out of three in the workforce is labored under agriculture however, it accounts
only for 12% of the total GDR. Like in other countries, this sector exhibits a low
labor productivity performance. Therefore, in the case of Turkish accession, this
would lead to emigration due to job openingsxxxix An important reason what
makes Turkey a more realistic candidate compared to other candidate countries is
Turkey’s trade surplus on the EU agricultural goods. This is because of Turkey’s
favorable climate, in which it can concentrate in products that the EU countries do
not slowdown in buying. Not only the EU hinders these products like fruits,
vegetables and nuts from coming in from Turkey, but also protects them even
more in contrast to the other central and eastern European countries.
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In the case of Turkish accession to the European Union, the shield on this sector
would be lifted, and therefore can create advantages for the EU; for instance
increasing farm sizes. Since the majority of the exports from Turkey arrive at the
EU from a small growing sector, productivity of the people in this sector will be
more important in the future.
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Another benefit Europeans would enjoy is the foreign direct investment to
Turkey. As pointed out earlier in the section Turkish economy, Turkey has been
the target of increasing Foreign Direct Investment since 2001. After a possible
Turkish accession, investors from the EU will have an advantage compared to
other foreign investors who do not have any privileges. Moreover, Turkish
membership in the EU would assure the future maintenance of Turkey’s open
economy policy.
Immigration
one of the factors that make Turkey’s accession unique from the previous
enlargements is its population. Aside from the pessimistic views, in one of the EU
Commission documents it was noted that a possible mass migration from Turkey
following a Turkish accession is considered. Although the EU fears the migration
to cause a serious discomfort in the EU labor market, study results also show that
“Turkish population dynamics might provide benefits in terms of balancing the
ageing population in the EU...”xli Furthermore, some EU policy makers and
financial analysts feed optimistic views concerning the contribution of Turkish
accession to the EU labor market needs. The EU economy is slowly suffering
from disappearance of working age population and increasing the elder
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population. Therefore, Krieger and Maitre (2006) argue that the younger Turkish
population may well be the antidote for the problematic EU labor markets,
especially if Turkey can take an advantage of the situation in Europe and use its
demographic power to educate and train its young population according to the
current EU market needs.
Although Europeans fear Turkish migration due to various social, economic and
political reasons, it is believed to have positive effects on EU fiscal balances as
well. After a comprehensive Krieger’s (2004) findings reveal that Turkish
migrants have a better education than those from Central and Eastern European
members and are likely between the ages 15-39. Brücker (2002) reports that over
their life cycle, Turkish migrants’ net tax payments (tax payments = social
security transfer + government expenditures) exhibit positive numbers especially
if they are between 11 and 48 years of age. A Turkish immigrant contributes
50,000 Euros on average over his or her lifecycle as long as it fits the descriptions
above. Moreover, another Swedish analyst Storeseltten, finds similar results
regarding the net contribution of a Turkish guest worker over his lifetime.
According to his research, a young working immigrant contributes a net present
value of US$ 23,500 to Swedish government.
Access to Energy
Compared to aging Europe, Turkey is not only rich in terms of human
energy but its strategic location also plays a major role concerning the natural
energy resources. Europe demands more and more energy every single day, and
according to European Energy and Transport Trends, Europe will demand 160%
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more natural gas throughout the next thirty years. Currently, Russia plays the
major role in providing Europe’s natural gas demands. Although Russia supplied
67% of European gas in 2000, this amount will certainly drop down to lower
levels, as low as 35% in 2020’s. In this regard, Central Asia, and the Middle East
will play a more critical role in the necessity for the expansion in energy supply
sources. Additionally, Europe will also need to diversify the energy transfer paths
for a safer access to its energy needs.
Considering this background, it is the essential for Europe to build a closer
relationship with Turkey, in order to diversify the sources that supply the energy
and ensure the path of access. Turkey’s location plays a critical role, serving as an
energy corridor connecting East to West, as well as the North to South, and
bridging the Middle Eastern and Caspian energy to Europe. In short, Turkey has
already been an energy center and its significance has been growing as new
international projects that are critical for the future of the area emerge.
A project that will have geopolitical consequences would be the 1730
kilometer-long recently running Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) delivering crude oil
from Azerbaijan to Ceyhan Port in Turkey, which is capable of transporting 50
million metric tons per year. It is crucial to note that this project that is bringing
almost 1 billion barrels per day to Turkey is actually not dependent to OPEC
countries and Russia.xlii
After the projects like (BTC) and the pending projects such as Nabucco, which
will be channeling Caspian natural gas to Europe, it is anticipated that Ceyhan
port of Turkey will replace Rotterdam in transporting energy resources to
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international markets.xliii Therefore, as a member state, Turkey would support the
security of access to energy as well as the diversification supplies once it becomes
a member state.
Chapter 4: Conclusion

In fact, the reason why the EU delays the accession talks and negotiations with
Turkey is not due to the economic weakness of Turkey. Convergence of the
candidate countries’ economies is not a pre-requisite of membership, even if the
countries have unemployment or regional income disparity problems like Turkey
does. As considerable amount of evidence shows, economic progress is an
expected result of honest institutions and sophisticated social capital (as seen from
the graph below).
Correlation between GDP per capita and Quality of Public Institutions

xliv

Further, corrupt institutions and weak social capital of the country will cause
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integration problems in the EU internal market that is becoming more competitive
every single day. As indicated earlier in this project, income differences between
countries disappear very slowly, but they do not serve as an obstacle for
membership while corrupt institutions constitute major obstacles in terms of
successful implementation of the EU economic criteria. Concerning the quality of
institutions, the WEF index considers Turkey to be more advanced than Romania
and comparable to Bulgaria. However, in the long-term, receiving aids by the EU,
Turkish institutions can benefit significantly under EU market competition.

The European social welfare form, excessive regulation with massive monetary
transfers to poorer members has been under constant pressure ever since. It does
not even encourage the economic progression. However, there is only one case of
success in which budget transfers were actually useful: Ireland. Besides taking
advantage from the EU redistribution, Ireland also benefited from the attraction of
foreign direct investment, implementation from significant tax changes and
investing in education and technology.

I personally do not believe that the EU should absorb all the third world countries
and try to make them a better one, as it is not realistic and it does not reflect the
true goals of the EU. However, Spain at the beginning of the 1970s was not an
eligible country to join the EU. But Spain has changed tremendously and
permanently and in today’s union, it is an indispensable member. If the chance is
given, I have no doubt that so will Turkey.
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Summary of Capstone Project
European Union is a unique financial and political partnership composed of 27
sovereign states who are working together for the benefit of all their citizens. It
was established following the Second World War, initially aimed at stimulating
the economic cooperation and tie European countries to one another through
trade. Therefore, they are economically dependent on each other due to bilateral
trade. Since then, the EU became a huge single market adopting euro as its
common currency. As the EU continued to expand, it was necessary for the
candidate states to fulfill economic and political criteria in order to become a part
of the union.
Currently the EU got over the worst days of the Eurozone crisis in general
and has been facing a mild recession with signs of stabilization. Due to decreasing
growth momentum and low confidence, the real GDP of the EU is estimated to
drop by 0.3% in the Eurozone towards the end of 2012. At the same time, besides
Belgium, Greece, Spain, Italy, Cyprus, Hungary, the Netherlands, Portugal, and
Slovenia, the growth is expected to be positive. Therefore, economic convergence
is still in process; however, is nowhere close to being done. With inflation
declining only gradually, the EU is cruising through a crisis slowly, but currently
still in it.
The longest and still ongoing enlargement negotiation process of the EU is
the one with Turkey and Turkish accession talks have been around since 1950s.
Unlike any other EU country, Turkey faced record pace growth levels, surpassing
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China’s GDP growth in the first quarter of 2011. Decreasing inflation, public debt
at manageable levels, relatively lower unemployment levels compared to some
EU countries, Turkish economy wants to prove that it is currently a good fit for
the EU single market, although there will be some costs for joining the EU.
Implementing the whole body of law, will cause both economic and political costs
since the laws will be questioned by other parties and the ruling party will be
blamed for accepting and implementing some of the laws. In addition, once
Turkey is accepted as a member state, Turkish business would need to be
privatized and liberalized. This also can cause issues since so many people would
be opposed to the idea of privatizing government businesses. Finally, the most
efficient sector working in Turkey, agriculture would also be affected negatively
by the policies Turkey would need to adopt.
Turkish membership talks still continue and Turkey is still not a member
because the EU has major fears regarding the financial effects following a Turkish
membership. The EU believes that Turkey is too big of a country and relatively
too weak of an economy compared to other members. Additionally, the free travel
of Turkish workers within the EU, especially to the industrialized countries is a
huge financial concern for the industrialized member states. According to the
financial analysts, Turkish accession is also regarded to have too much cost in
terms of money transfers that would be made to Turkey after the accession.
Besides from the financial implications which are predicted negative, the EU does
not expect to collect worthy benefits from the bilateral trade between Turkey and
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the EU. The EU also believes that EU businesses investing in Turkey will not be
privileged just because Turkey is a member of the EU.
Although the public opinion of majority of the EU countries is against the
Turkish accession, it is crucial to consider the positions of some relevant actors.
Until the presidency of Sarkozy, France was in favor for Turkish accession.
Similarly, until CDU, led by Angela Merkel, joined SPD to form a coalition
government in Germany, SPD was in favor for Turkish accession. Greece was an
ardent opponent of Turkish membership; however, its position changed
tremendously in the recent years. Although the Greek public opinion is still
slightly against Turkish accession, the recent Greek governments believe that
Greece can solve its problems with Turkey though EU enforcement, under EU
authority. Unlike the other member states, England, under both previous and
current Prime Ministers, has been concerned with the security issues and wanted
to expand the EU borders and include Turkey.
In order to predict the possible financial impacts of Turkish accession, I
have considered the most recent EU enlargement, the cases of Romania and
Bulgaria. These two countries had weaker economies compared to the EU average
and were terribly affected by the financial crisis yet showed signs of convergence
despite the ongoing economic crisis. The biggest problem of these two countries
was corruption in the government which held the institutions from running
smoothly. This was also a problem for Turkey and is one of the biggest reasons
why Turkish economy could not transform into an elite level of economy.
Although these two countries faced a decrease in the GDP growth and
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employment due to the economic financial crisis, the EU accession decreased the
negative implications though increased trade and cooperation. Once these two
counties get rid of corrupt governments with the help of the EU, their growth will
be sustainable.
Although EU has fears born out of a suffering from negative financial
implications from a Turkish accession, EU will be able to collect many benefits
once Turkey is a member state. First of all, when Turkey becomes an EU member
and its institutions face EU encouraged reforms, it will definitely attract more
foreign capital. Besides investment, bilateral trade will also increase since both
sides would get rid of technical barriers and tariffs on agricultural products.
Turkish accession will expand the market; create job openings and a market for
EU products. In particular, excess agricultural products that are sold at a very low
price would find a market to be sold at higher places. Immigration is a feared
financial consequence of Turkish accession; however, several simulations point
out that the EU can benefit from this in a number of ways. Migration of Turkish
youth within aging Europe and the monetary contribution effect of those
immigrants over their lifetime to the countries they lived in are expected as
positive financial implications. Lastly, being an emerging energy port of the
world, Turkey would be able to provide safer energy access to the EU than
Russia, who cut of the energy supply for political reasons in the past.
Although EU would be able to benefit from Turkish accession in many
ways, Turkey does still not have an elite level economy and has to sustain its
current growth to become one. The EU should not accept countries that could be
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damaging its already volatile economy although it did accept countries that were
not in the level of the member states. Overall when we look at this possible
accession from Turkey’s perspective, budget transfers and short-term bilateral
trade implications are not going to turn Turkey to an industrialized economy.
However, as seen from many literatures, what lies behind sustained economic
growth is a government with efficient institutions. EU could encourage Turkey to
reform and establish less corrupt and therefore more efficient operating
institutions and this could transform Turkey into a better economy.
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